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# INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS OF BIOTERRORISM PLANNING



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# Learning Objectives

- Understand the definition of intelligence
- Understanding the Bioterrorist cycle to identify potential points for interdiction
- Identify potential indicators of bioterrorism
- Identify potential suspicious behaviour



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# Intelligence

- Intelligence is **adding value** to information through **analysis** to provide **insight** and **influence decision making**






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# Deductive Reasoning

- All the facts put together to form a conclusion



Sherlock Holmes





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# Inductive Reasoning

- Making a conclusion when not all the facts are known
  - Intelligence




007 Bond James Bond



# Technical and Forensic Intelligence



- Technical Intelligence
  - Analysis of technical/scientific information for intelligence purposes
- Forensic Intelligence
  - Is the application of forensic science and techniques with the analysis of results supporting intelligence as opposed to being presented as evidence





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Biological Intelligence

- Intelligence gathered relating to bioterrorist activity including:
  - Bioterrorist planning, biological agent acquisition, agent production and dissemination.
- All steps in the Bioterrorist cycle could have indicators of bioterrorist activity
  - Maybe difficult to detect
  - Legitimate uses or dual use could be hard to identify
- Could lead to interdiction of activity to prevent a bioterrorist incident




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R  
P  
O  
L



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# Bioterrorist Intelligence Cycle





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N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Intelligence Indicators

- May be difficult to detect preparation
- Will almost never advertise their intent
- Unlikely to claim responsibility
- Maybe indicators of planning, acquisition, suspicious behaviour production and dissemination
  - Increased awareness of Bioterrorism post-2001



Shoko Asahara

Bruce Ivins



Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh



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R  
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L



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# Indicators of Planning



- Terrorist organization recruiting educated people from universities/ hospitals/ laboratories
- Connections of terrorists with biological laboratories
- Interest in laboratory holding biological agents





# Indicators of Planning

- Interest in disease endemic areas or disease outbreaks
- Interest in extremist literature (e.g. "Silent Death")
- Recovery of periodicals, instruction manuals or web resources providing biological agent production recipes





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
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# Indicators of Acquisition

- Fraudulent acquisition from commercial supplier
- Diversion of transported material
- Stolen from legitimate holding (e.g. laboratory)
  - Suspicious behaviour in the laboratory





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Indicators of Acquisition

- Purchase of plants or seeds known to be sources of toxins
- Theft or acquisition of lab equipment
- Acquired from nature/environment
  - Suspicious behavior in disease endemic areas





# Suspicious Behavior

- Suspicious behaviour may be the best indicator of planning of a bioterrorist event
- Suspicious behaviour in an individual or group is that which appears unusual or out of the ordinary
  - Subjective and relies on judgement and circumstances.
  - 'gut feeling' that something is wrong
- No definitive indicators of suspicious behaviour
- Suspicious behaviour could be from an outsider or from a trusted insider





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Suspicious Behavior

## ■ Outsider

- Suspicious or unusual interested in facilities housing biological agents
- Suspicious people loitering outside facilities housing biological agents – taking notes, photos, or drawings (surveillance)
- Breaches in security
- Attempts to acquire access passes, key codes or other access or identifying documents off staff working at facilities housing biological agents





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Suspicious Behavior

- **Trusted insider**
  - Change in political, religious or social ideology, particularly if accompanied by a changing attitude towards violence
  - Unexplained periods of absenteeism
  - Dramatic change in appearance
  - Becoming withdrawn or unwilling to socialise
  - Becoming furtive, secretive or excessively anxious or suspicious
  - Sudden change in financial status, such as coming into a lot of money



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N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
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# Suspicious Behavior

- **Trusted insider, cont**
  - Desire to work alone or outside regular working hour, without explanation
  - Interest in working outside usual role to gain access to biological agents
  - Interest in security of facilities
  - Downloading technical information on biological agents not relating to work
  - Evidence of record tampering or covering-up action



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N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Suspicious Behaviour

- **Contributing Factors**
  - Health crisis
    - serious illness, alcoholism drug habit or depression
  - Financial crisis
    - Loss of income, serious gambling habit or debts
  - Group/social circumstances
    - Belonging to extremist group or gang or having ties to such groups
  - Underlying mental health conditions
  - Subtle individual factors
    - Low self-esteem, attraction to violence or feeling of persecution.



I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Indicators of Production



- Modification of premises (e.g. taped windows, modification of ventilation systems)
- Possession of protective clothing, respirators or masks
- Unusual or suspicious purchase/possession of:
  - vaccines and antibiotics
  - antiseptics, bleach or other anti-microbial cleaning supplies
  - laboratory animals





# Indicators of Dissemination

- Recovery of dissemination devices or evidence of acquisition of dissemination devices
- Small scale "trial" attack
- Unusual or suspicious dead animals
- Presentation of people with atypical symptoms or clusters of people with unusual epidemiology at health care facilities





I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
P  
O  
L



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# Summary

- Intelligence adds value to information
  - Inductive reasoning
- Suspicious behavior
  - Trusted insider or breach from an outsider
- Maybe indicators of planning of bioterrorism events
  - No one indicator pieces of a puzzle
  - Interdiction opportunities

