

## **Roundtable Discussion VI: Advancements/Progress and Update from Last Year**

### **Recommendations from last year's meeting:**

- There is a need for a variety of tools and resources to facilitate terrorism-based risk assessments
  - Tools and resources should be developed and distributed to the international community
  - Important to create a common international language and understanding of basic bioterrorism risk assessment concepts
  
- Similarly, risk assessment methodologies and results should be shared
  - The types of information requested most often included scenarios types and results, gaps and uncertainty results, risk communication, and risk management practices

**Are next year's recommendation's the same?  
If so, how do we get there?**

**Additional recommendations?**

## Thoughts, ideas, and issues discussed during Round Table IV Oct 8, 2009

- We need to ask policy makers what they need/want in a risk assessment.
- We must instill a level of confidence concerning our risk assessments and how to effectively manage risk. It is also critical to effectively communicate risk.
- This is important for both general and/or specific risk assessments.
- This is a cyclical process: policy drives risk assessments, and risk assessments drive policy.
- We must determine our goal for future work.
- Thoughts include sharing data recovery, reports, lessons learned, consequence management, and best practices.
- This is from both our work with US attacks and any research work.
- Other thoughts included sharing websites, databases, and specific data to feed into models.
- If a shared website was to be created for all to share, should it be limited access or publicly available?
- It is critical to engage both the scientific community and the policy community on risk assessment.
- Because risk assessments involve a multidisciplinary approach, we must have multidisciplinary meetings to discuss risk. Maybe future meetings should include economists, social scientists etc.
- There should be an international discussion or rationalization for why specific agents are on control lists, such as agents listed on the Australia Group list.
- It is important to engage the EU more substantively to expand future engagement. Other groups suggested include the Global Risk Assessment Dialogue.
- It was suggested to share lessons learned, perform trainings, exercises, and/or scenarios.
- To achieve these tasks will require sustainability and a road map for collaboration.
- Other ideas include developing technical recommendations from working group meetings (for example, how to secure or control a particular agent, the use of risk assessment, risk assessment language, recommendations etc.)
- It was suggested to develop various Bio, Chem, or Radiological focus/working groups.
- If such working groups were created, it would be important to meet frequently and before each annual DHS International Symposiums.
- Such working group topic ideas could include: decontamination, pathogen security, and surveillance.
- To be successful, working groups would need leadership, support, and communication. It would be necessary to have a country take a lead, and be a secretariat. Meetings should be quarterly, remote, and unclassified. Meetings should also rotate locations.
- It may be possible for working groups to interact remotely via the web or internet.
- Some topics or issues to be discussed at next year's or future meetings include:
  - Perspective of intent from social scientists
  - Strengthening surveillance networks

- Other scenarios, such as endemic organisms or overt vs. covert
- Risk management
- Broadening our scope to include biosecurity or biorisks, not just bioterrorism.
- Likelihood
- Informing the intelligence community
- Include a broader scope (human/animal/plant) and broader expertise